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Abstract. Recent research has on the basis of general equilibrium models warned that 
trade liberalisation in non-optimally managed renewable resources might cause over-
exploitation and reduced steady-state welfare. Welfare effects of trade liberalisation in 
open access and optimal management are found case specific and dependent on factors 
such as the country’s status as importer or exporter, the state of the fish stocks and the 
size of the countries on the world market. The present paper develops an alternative 
partial equilibrium framework capable of identifying welfare effects of fish trade 
liberalisation also in the presence of complex but realistic management schemes, such 
as regulated open access and regulated restricted access. The case dependency known 
from the general equilibrium analysis is confirmed, but the introduction of realistic 
fisheries management schemes in the partial equilibrium model extended this case 
dependency. The welfare effect of trade liberalisation in an exporter country is negative 
under open access, but was found positive under regulated restricted access in the 
present paper.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework for fish trade policy analysis under 
complex but realistic fisheries management settings, thereby delivering the theoretical 
basis for empirical welfare analysis of fish trade. A partial equilibrium approach is 
developed and circumstances under which trade liberalisation cause welfare gains and 
losses are identified theoretically. Trade liberalisation is modelled as the removal of a 
tariff, but also applies to the analysis of reductions in other trade measures that open up 
or increase trade between two countries.  
 The development of an analytical framework for fish trade policy analysis in the 
presence of complex but realistic fisheries management is important, since fisheries 
management is decisive for whether gains or losses follow fish trade liberalisation. 
Furthermore, the recently introduced general equilibrium model for analysing trade 
liberalisation in renewable resources is only developed for open access and optimal 
managed fisheries [1-5]. Owing to the complexities in the existent general equilibrium 
model, combined with the general welfare concept of “steady state utility”, it is unlikely 
that this model in its present form is well suited for taking complex and realistic 
fisheries management schemes into account. Finally, the development of an analytical 
framework for trade liberalisation in products originating from fisheries with regulated 
open access and regulated restricted access is important, since such management exists 
in several and probably most fisheries worldwide. The partial equilibrium approach of 
the present paper links together basic results from trade theory with long runs 
comparative static of fisheries economics. Thereby, the paper delivers a theoretical 
framework for the empirical identification of welfare effects, which does not exist 
today. One hypothesis is that welfare effects of trade liberalisation remain empirical, i.e. 
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that it is impossible to obtain unambiguous results theoretically. Another hypothesis is 
that results obtained in the recently developed general equilibrium model of trade in 
renewable resources needs modification, when analyses are performed for a complex 
and realistic fisheries management schemes.  
The issue is also important from a policy perspective since tariffs on fish products 
again have become an issue in the international trade negotiations of market access of 
non-agricultural products after the Doha Ministerial Meeting in November 2001 [6]. 
Moreover, most countries worldwide use trade measures on fish products today and as 
these measures indirectly are resource taxes in exporter countries and subsidies in 
importer countries, trade policies indirectly serve as fisheries management instruments. 
Liberalising trade will therefore affect the fisheries and might, due to externalities in 
production, cause counterintuitive and unintended welfare losses in countries with non-
optimal fisheries management. Furthermore, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the 
United Nations [7] assess that 75% of fish stocks worldwide are fully exploited, 
overexploited or recovering. As a consequence, management measures have been 
imposed over the last 2-3 decades. On this basis integrated analysis of trade 
liberalisation and fisheries management becomes necessary to assess under what 
circumstances international fish trade liberalisation is desirable from a welfare 
economic point of view. 
Finally, the issue is interesting in relation to other sectors with externalities in 
production, such as forestry and sectors producing with pollution. Forestry is as 
fisheries based on renewable resources, which might be subject to open access in some 
countries, e.g. tropical timber in developing countries. Although long run in forestry is 
longer than in fisheries, since the growth of forests is slower than of most fish stocks, 
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the theoretical analysis of this paper also applies to assessing the welfare effects of 
liberalising trade in timber products. The theoretical analysis also holds for sectors 
producing with pollution, since trade liberalisation might imply increased production 
and thereby pollution. Welfare losses will then be the result of trade liberalisation if the 
increased negative value of pollution exceeds the value of production.  
The present paper adds to existing knowledge by developing a theoretical 
framework for the empirical identification of welfare effects of fish trade liberalisation 
under realistic fisheries management settings.  
 
2. Literature   
Liberalisation of international trade is traditionally analysed on the basis of the 
Ricardian theoretical tradition applied to international economics. Within this tradition, 
fish is regarded as a conventional good and the presence of international trade is 
explained by international division of labour and specialisation resulting from 
differences in technology. The Ricardian theoretical tradition was followed by the Neo-
classical tradition, mainly the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, which states that the presence of 
international trade results from differences in factor endowments. The consequence is 
that a global welfare optimum can only be reached in the case of free trade. Small 
countries, which are price takers on the world market, also face a situation where the 
welfare optimum can only be reached in the case of free trade, where large countries can 
affect their terms-of-trade and thereby reach a welfare optimum only in the presence of 
trade policies, provided that there is no retaliation from other countries.  These results 
are referred to as the conventional opinion.  
 5
In the nineties, a new tradition developed where it in a general equilibrium model 
was shown that advantages with free trade in renewable resources that are not managed 
optimally exist only under certain conditions and for certain types of countries, owing to 
externalities in production [1-5].  
Simultaneous, resource economics develops in a partial equilibrium framework. 
This theoretical tradition is, however, directed at bio-economics and resource 
management, not on trade liberalisation. It is shown in the present paper that this 
tradition has the ability to contribute in identifying and analysing welfare effects of 
liberalising fish trade. In particular where management are regulated open access or 
regulated restricted access, as is the case in most fisheries worldwide.  
An overview of literature contributing in the explanation of welfare effects of 
liberalising fish trade is presented in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 
 
The focus in the present paper is on the development of the partial equilibrium model. 
As opposed to existent general equilibrium models the partial equilibrium model is 
capable of identifying the welfare effects of liberalising trade in renewable resources 
under complex and realistic management, i.e. regulated open access and regulated 
restricted access. It is further capable of identifying welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation of different sectors. 
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3. The model 
The partial equilibrium model of fish trade liberalisation is based on the backward 
bending supply function [8-12] combined with the two country analytical framework of 
[13]. The model consists of a backward-bending supply function and a traditional 
demand function. Following Clark [10], the simple equilibrium supply function of a fish 
stock with open access can be deduced on the basis of the Schaefer model in eq. 1. 
 
qES
KS
SrS
dt
dS −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= 1  (1) 
 
Where S denotes the stock, t is time, r the intrinsic growth rate of the stock, SK the 
carrying capacity of the stock, E effort and q the catchability coefficient. The first part 
of the right hand side is the absolute natural stock growth and the second is the harvest. 
The conditions for bionomic equilibrium are now that eq. 1 equals zero, i.e. that growth 
equals harvest, and that the resource rent is zero since the fishery is characterised by 
open access, i.e. that R=(pqs-c)E=0 with R representing the resource rent, p the price 
and c the costs. Using these conditions and rearranging gives the supply function in 
equilibrium, where the sustained yield is expressed in terms of the price:  
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
KpqS
c
pq
rcY 1  (2) 
 
Where Y is long-run sustainable yield. It can further be shown that the supply function 
is increasing until p=2c/qSK and then decrease towards zero as p increases. Therefore, 
the supply function is backward-bending. The peak is known as the Maximum 
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Sustainable Yield (MSY) above which fishing at an effort level over the effort level 
associated with the MSY is characterised as biological overfishing.  
The supply curve in regulated open access and regulated restricted access follows 
the backward bending supply (average cost) curve under open access for small fishing 
efforts. However, at fishing efforts sufficiently above MSY, a quota gives a vertical 
supply curve, since quotas traditionally are introduced only after the stock has become 
overexploited. Hence, for p>2c/qSK, the supplies is given by YY = , where Y  represents 
the quota.  
The demand function of a fish product can be deduced as the aggregate of what the 
single consumers are willing to pay for the fish product. That is, where consumer 
utilities are maximised subject to budget restrictions. For a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function with two goods, Y as the fish product and Q as all other goods (a numeraire 
good), utility (u) is given by . Maximising this with subject 
to , where X is income and 0<a<1, yields the demand function for the fish 
product in eq. 3.  
( ) aQaYQYu −= 1,
XQQPYYP =+
 
( ) ( ) ( )QQYYY lnln1ln ααα ++=  (3) 
 
Contrary to the supply function, the demand function for a fish product is not distinct 
from the demand function for a conventional good. The demand function is decreasing 
with yield. 
The demand and supply curves of a capture fish stock are shown in Figure 2 for an 
open access fishery.  
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Figure 2 
 
The bionomic equilibrium is shown where the supply (average cost) and demand curves 
intersect at E in Figure 2, and even though the resource rent is zero in the open access 
equilibrium, the existence of the fishery still results in positive economic benefits. This 
benefit consists of the consumer surplus (shown as the shaded triangle in Figure 2) and 
the producer surplus (shown as the shaded rectangle). The consumer surplus is defined 
traditionally as the difference between the amount the consumers are willing to pay and 
the amount they actually pay.  
Following Copes [9], an average social cost (ASC) curve is measured in terms of the 
opportunity costs of capital and labor. The curve is shown in Figure 2 and is lower than 
the average cost curve. The producer surplus now represents the difference between 
average cost and average social cost curve, represented by the lower shaded area in 
figure 2. The producer surplus is defined as “the return which is left to the remuneration 
of capital and labour above the level in alternative uses”. That is, if the remuneration of 
capital and labor is on the same level as in its alternative use the producer surplus is 
zero. Provided that it is positive, it is larger than in alternative use. Thereby, the 
remuneration of capital and labor is positive in open access, but not higher than in 
alternative use, i.e. not higher than in other industries.  
 
 
4. Theoretical welfare analysis  
Based on the partial equilibrium model outlined above for a closed economy, a welfare 
analysis of the effects of liberalising international trade in a fish product originating 
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from a capture fish stock, is made following the analytical framework of [13]. Krugman 
and Obstfeld [13] analyses an initial situation where two countries (home as the 
importer and foreign as the exporter) trade with one another in the presence of an import 
tariff. The effect of removing the tariff is analysed for the importer country, considering 
the other country as the rest of the world. The analyses are performed for two large 
countries with power on the world market. Subsequently, they are repeated for small 
countries facing fixed prices on the world market. This framework is applied as the 
basis here, although the present analysis is for a good produced on the basis of a 
renewable resource, whereas Krugman and Obstfeld [13] perform their analysis on a 
conventional good. The analyses follow in two steps. Firstly, price effects of trade 
liberalisation are identified and, secondly, based on the price effects, welfare analyses 
are performed.  
 Welfare is analysed in two situations. First, for two large countries with their own 
open access fish stock and, secondly, for two large countries with regulated open access 
and regulated restricted access.  
In the open access case the price effects of removing an import tariff are presented 
in Figure 3a and welfare effects in Figure 3b and 3c. The curves in Figure 3b and 3c are 
identical to the curves in the left and right hand diagrams of Figure 3a.  
Figure 3  
  
Figure 3a consists of three diagrams, one of the home market, one of the world market 
and one of the foreign market. Demand and supply on the home and foreign markets 
follows directly from Figure 2, where supply and demand on the world market appears 
as excess supply from the foreign market and excess demand from the home market. At 
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the world market, the initial import tariff used in home is shown together with the 
corresponding prices in home (PTH) and foreign (PTF). Moreover, the free trade price 
(PW) is shown and it appears that removing the tariff implies that the tariff wedge at the 
world market between prices at the home and the foreign market disappears and drives 
international trade up from QT to QW. Subsequently, trade liberalisation will in the 
model always be followed by a fall in the price in the importer country and a rise in the 
price in the exporter country.  
Based on this framework, the welfare effects of removing the tariff in the open 
access case are outlined in Figure 3b and 3c in home and foreign. On the home market, 
the following areas give the welfare effect: 
 
Change in consumer surplus: (a + b + g + h) 
Change in producer surplus: + (d + e + f) – (a) 
Tariff revenue: - (f + g + h + i + j) 
Change in welfare: (b + d + e) – (i + j) 
 
The welfare effect of trade liberalisation is generally indeterminate, since the consumer 
surplus rises and the tariff revenue disappears. This is similar for conventional goods.  
Figure 3b can also be used to determine the welfare effect of trade liberalisation in a 
small importer country. In that case PW = PTF, since there is no effect through the terms 
of trade. In such an analysis it is, however, emphasised that although the analysis based 
on Figure 3b still applies, the analysis of Figure 3a does not, since the small country 
does not have the ability to affect the world market price. The domestic price is given 
exogenously by the world market price. In Figure 3b the tariff is then measured by the 
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difference between PTH and PW and the welfare change becomes (b + d + e + f). 
Thereby, the welfare effect of trade liberalisation in a small importing country with an 
open access fish stock is unambiguously positive. Again, this result follows from 
conventional opinion.  
On the foreign market, the following areas give the welfare effect: 
 
Change in consumer surplus: - (x) 
Change in producer surplus: + (x + y) – (v + w) 
Change in welfare: + (y) – (v + w) 
 
This implies that the welfare effect of trade liberalisation in an exporting country in the 
open access case is not unambiguous. If y > (v + w) welfare will rise, otherwise welfare 
will fall. Since Figure 3b, but not 3a, could be used to analyse welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation for small importer countries, Figure 3c, and again not 3a, can be used to 
analyse welfare effects of trade liberalisation for small exporter countries. The analysis 
of Figure 3c is, however, identical for small and large exporter countries, since large 
exporter countries in this analysis are assumed not to have trade policy instruments, 
such as importer countries having import tariffs.  
Krugman and Obstfeld [13] analyses the trade policies of a large importer country 
for a conventional good by introducing the concept of “an optimal tariff” to denote the 
tariff at which welfare is maximised. They show that welfare can only be maximised by 
the active use of the trade policy, since the terms-of-trade (Pexport/PImport) will be 
worsened by trade liberalisation if the tariff is below the level of the optimal tariff.  
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Effects of removing the import tariff under regulated open access and regulated 
restricted access in the importer country was found similar to under open access. For the 
exporter country results under regulated open access and regulated restricted access, the 
results differ from open access. Not the price effects, but the welfare effects differ. 
Prices rise in the exporter country under both regulated open access and regulated 
restricted access. 
Welfare effects of removing the import tariff under regulated open access and 
regulated restricted access in an exporter country are outlined in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Under regulated open access, a quota is fixed on a sustainable level and the fishery will 
be characterised by entry of new vessels until the remuneration of capital and labor are 
on the same level as in alternative use. Thus, the welfare effects in the exporter country 
under regulated open access are given by the following areas: 
 
Change in consumer surplus: - (v) 
Change in producer surplus: + (v + r) – (x) 
Change in welfare: (r) – (x) 
 
The welfare effect of trade liberalisation in the exporter country under regulated open 
access is given by (r – x). It is, however, known that x = (v – r), since increasing income 
originating from increasing prices is all used to investments in the “race for fish”.  
Thereby, the producer surplus remains unchanged and the total welfare effect of trade 
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liberalization in an exporter country with a regulated open access fish stock will 
unambiguously be negative. This welfare loss is similar to in open access.  
Regulated restricted access exists in several different forms and may or may not 
secure optimal management, dependent on how both input and output regulation are 
used. If a quota is fixed at the MEY level and input is limited to the minimum 
necessary, management is optimal in an economic sense. Trade liberalisation will then 
be followed by welfare gains. If, on the other hand, the quota is fixed on a level above 
MSY and the input remains limited to the minimum necessary, the welfare effect of 
trade liberalisation in the exporter country are, as shown in figure 4, given by the 
following areas: 
 
Change in consumer surplus: - (v) 
Change in producer surplus: + (v) – (r) 
Change in welfare: + (r) 
 
The welfare effect of trade liberalisation in the exporter country under regulated 
restricted access is unambiguous positive, since all the increasing income appearing due 
to the rising prices, cause extra profit. This welfare gain following from trade 
liberalisation in an exporter country with a regulated restricted managed fish stock with 
a quota above an effort level associated with the MSY is new and does not follow from 
conventional opinion.  
The welfare effects of trade liberalisation where both countries have their own 
managed fish stock then depend on the detailed design and use of the management 
system. In non-optimally managed fisheries this design and use is again determined by 
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the relative power of managers and fishermen, since the fishermen currently active have 
an interest in maximising their individual harvest and profit. Otherwise, their followers 
will gain in the future at their expense. Against them stands the interest of society, 
which might gain by reducing short run harvest in order to maximise steady state 
harvest and welfare. The level at which the quota is set will now depend on who is the 
strongest. Fishermen associations will lobby for an open access situation and the 
government will work for optimal management.  
The effect of trade liberalisation in an importer country with an open access fish 
stock depends on whether the importer country possesses market power on the world 
market. Markets for several individual fish species are found internationally integrated 
[14, 15]. This implies that countries need to be very large in terms of consumption to be 
able to influence world prices. On the other hand, the majority of global fish 
consumption is consumed within three countries; Japan, the EU and the US, implying 
that such importer countries are large and might be able to affect the world market 
prices. Furthermore, several examples of fish consumption being characterised as 
heterogeneous in terms of e.g. cultural differences, imply that niche markets also exists. 
On niche markets, importer countries might be able to influence prices through their 
trade policies.  
The effect of trade liberalisation of renewable resources then follows from the 
traditional theory of international economics. The exception is, however, for a large 
importer country where the welfare effect of trade liberalisation is indeterminate, since 
consumers gain, the tariff revenue falls and producers might gain or lose. This effect is 
also indeterminate for a conventional good according to the traditional theory of 
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international economics, but the present analysis show that the effects are driven by 
more factors.  
Since the above conclusions are reached using a two-country model for fishing 
fleets fishing on one species solely owned by the single country and for trade in only 
one product form, aspects such as competition between more than two countries, shared 
stocks, multi-species fisheries, environmental multi-species relations and localisation of 
value added activities are ignored. The inclusion of such factors in the analysis would 
increase the applicability of results.  
 
5. Discussion 
The results of the recently developed general equilibrium model of trade in renewable 
resources was confirmed in the present paper in, that welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation depend on several factors, including the countries’ status as importers or 
exporters, the state of the fish stock and the size of the country on the world market. But 
the hypothesis that some results from the general equilibrium model of trade in 
renewable resources needs modification when taking realistic fisheries management into 
account also seems to hold. For example, Brander and Taylor [2] find that the small 
exporter country of a renewable resource loses harvest and steady state utility from 
trade liberalisation. In the present paper it is found that in the small exporter country of 
a regulated open access fish stock, the catch will remain unchanged, consumer surplus 
fall and producer surplus remain unchanged. Hence, a total welfare loss result, but 
without any effect on supply. In the small exporter country of a regulated restricted 
access fish stock the catch will also remain unchanged, consumer surplus fall, but 
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producer surplus will rise. The result is a total welfare gain, as opposed to the welfare 
loss under open access in the general equilibrium model.  
 The hypothesis of the present paper that welfare effects of trade liberalisation 
remain theoretically indeterminate and therefore empirical also holds. The case 
dependency result of the general equilibrium model of trade in renewable resources was 
confirmed, but the introduction of realistic fisheries management schemes in the partial 
equilibrium model extended this case dependency, owing to differences in management 
systems and the use of them.  
The implications of these findings are two-fold, covering economic modelling and 
policy issues. The implication for economic modelling is that neither conventional 
opinion, nor the opinion following from the recently developed general equilibrium 
model of trade in renewable resources, are sufficient to identify the welfare effect of 
liberalising fish trade. Reliable modelling of the welfare effects of fish trade 
liberalisation might necessarily be undertaken for complex and realistic management 
systems, such as regulated open access and regulated restricted access. Moreover, since 
the welfare effects depend on several and sometimes opposed factors, empirical analysis 
is in most cases necessary to reach unambiguous results. Therefore, reliable modelling 
should necessarily be based on detailed knowledge of management, since many 
management systems are of the regulated restricted access type, which might be 
relatively effective or totally ineffective, dependent on the use. Finally, reliable 
modelling should take into account that vessels are heterogeneous, since a part of the 
total welfare effect is otherwise omitted. 
The policy implications of the findings from the recently developed general 
equilibrium model of trade in renewable resources suggest that blind trade liberalisation 
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in capture fish products is not necessarily desirable. Basically, welfare related to the 
uses of trade policies is interconnected to fisheries management and a welfare 
optimisation policy needs to take both into account. The optimal policy remains 
simultaneous optimal fisheries management and free trade for small countries. This is 
also the case for large countries, except that the optimal policy remains determined 
where trade policies are actively used to exercise market power.  
The policy implication of the finding of the present paper adds to this knowledge by 
detailing the analysis of fish trade liberalisation suggesting that some conclusions from 
the general equilibrium model of trade in renewable resources should be modified for 
realistic fisheries management schemes. For example, the welfare effect of trade 
liberalisation in an exporter country is negative under open access [2], but positive 
under regulated restricted access. The finding of the present paper further add to the 
findings from the recently developed general equilibrium model of trade in renewable 
resources by that welfare effects of trade liberalisation remains indeterminate and 
thereby empirical. Therefore, the identification of welfare effects of fish trade 
liberalisation must be based on empirical studies, which can depart from the present 
partial equilibrium approach.  
Hence, even though the findings from the recently developed literature and the 
findings of the present paper add to the understanding of the welfare effects of fish trade 
liberalisation, the issue is far from fully settled. A number of contributions have been 
made in the last decade. Schulz [11] Conclude that “trade policy is a too general 
measure for the management of living resources, and may implicate important economic 
distortions to the ecological system”. Brander and Taylor [16] Further concludes that 
“while we are convinced that none of our results is sufficient reason to abandon ongoing 
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trade liberalisation around the world, we are equally convinced that trade liberalisation 
is a two-edged sword for a country with a comparative advantage in renewable 
resources and weak property rights in these sectors”. Emami and Johnson [4] conclude 
that the WTO “should not always insist on free trade, rather they must pay careful 
attention to the particular relationships between trade conditions and natural resource 
policies among trading nations”. The present paper finds that under realistic 
management settings the results obtained in the general equilibrium model needs 
modification, welfare effects are case specific and their identification claims empirical 
analysis.  
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FIGURE 1. The contribution of international trade theory and resource economics in explaining 
welfare effects of liberalising international fish trade.  
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FIGURE 2. Supply and demand of a capture fish stock under open access 
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FIGURE 3. Effects of removing a tariff under open access 
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b) Welfare effects in home 
Quantity
Price
Demand
Supply = ACASC
PW
PTF
x y
z
v
w
 
c) Welfare effects in foreign 
 
 25
FIGURE 4.  Welfare effects of removing a tariff under regulated open access and regulated  
 restricted access in an exporter country 
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